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BOOK REVIEW 
COMMENTS ON HENRY J. RICHARDSON III,  
THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
(Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2008) 
D. A. Jeremy Telman 
Valparaiso University School of Law 
(forthcoming in 24/2South African Journal of Human Rights 
(2009) 
Professor Richardson’s work makes important contributions on 
two fronts.  It is a sophisticated work of both historical scholarship 
and critical race theory.  As historical scholarship, The Origins of 
the African-American Interest in International law is a synthetic 
work, drawing on diverse historical sources to recount a detailed 
narrative of African-American claims to, interests in and appeals to 
international law over approximately two centuries spanning, with 
occasional peeks both forward and backward in time, from the 
landing of the first African slaves at Jamestown in 1619 to the 
1815 Treaty of Ghent, ending the War of 1812 between Britain and 
the United States.  Regarded as such, the book is richly rewarding.  
Professor Richardson excavates historical source material for 
evidence of the claims made by people of African heritage for 
freedom, human dignity and self-determination.  These claims 
were variously expressed throughout the period of the Atlantic 
slave trade and the enslavement of people of African heritage in 
the Americas, often through conduct and other means might escape 
a more traditional historian’s gaze.   Richardson gives voice to 
these claims as interests in international law, even if they were not 
always conceived of as such by their authors and even if 
international law – in the imperfect form in which it existed at the 
time – did not recognize the justiciability of the claims.    
Second, the book is a contribution to the tradition of critical 
race theory.  It partakes of some of the narrative and 
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methodological strategies of that tradition, including the fictive 
reconstruction of historical events, with new African-American 
voices added to the mix.  But Professor Richardson is equally at 
ease with the approach to international law of the New Haven 
School, and he is thus able to write with great authority of how 
African-American history can be understood to have comprised a 
tradition of appeals to international law or international legal 
norms as a source of remediation of the injustices that African-
heritage people suffered in the Americas  
Viewed as a work of history, the book is not a typical product 
of archival research.  Professor Richardson does not and does not 
claim to have undertaken original historical work.  Rather, he has 
read innumerable historical monographs, works of legal and 
sociological theory, international law and critical race theory.  
Armed with this store of knowledge, he is able to recast a 
relatively familiar historical narrative –that of the Atlantic slave 
trade and the African-American experience – through the lens of 
international law.   
It is a shame that the academic discipline of history does not 
more highly prize such works of historical synthesis. One need not 
always mine the archives to make historical discoveries.  The most 
important historical discoveries are often hidden in plain sight.  So 
it is with this book.  There have been many histories written on the 
African-American experience, but Professor Richardson’s focus on 
the intersection of the history of the Atlantic slave trade with 
various overlapping legal regimes within which that trade 
developed permits us to view the history with fresh eyes.   
And works of historical synthesis are not so easy to compose as 
they might seem.  The story must be well told and it must be told 
from a novel perspective.  This calls for two surprisingly distinct 
sets of skills.  The historian who can tell a good tale is rarely the 
historian who can understand the broader ramifications of that tale 
any more than the tenor who sings Puccini could have composed 
the arias he sings.  And alas, intellectual historians who plumb the 
depths of consciousness in order to exhume our deepest thoughts, 
aspirations, achievements and fiascos rarely do so without 
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inflicting upon us so much erudition that we lose entirely the 
ability to turn a page.   
Telling the tale is especially challenging when it comes to the 
history of marginalized groups, since traditional historical sources 
rarely permit such groups to tell their stories in their own voices.  
Rather, the narrative historian must recreate their stories from such 
non-narrative sources as exist, such as birth, death, tax and census 
records and from non-traditional sources, such as folk tales, songs, 
fictionalized accounts and, as Professor Ricahrdson does with great 
success in this book, conduct.  In addition, legal documents are 
often the historian’s best hope for reviving some sense of the 
experienced of people who were not masters of their own destiny 
and who, as a consequence, had not mastered writing. 
And in this area, Professor Richardson’s methodology is most 
impressive.  He attempts to discern the intentions of African-
Americans through their conduct and articulates those intentions in 
terms of legal claims and legal interests.  He similarly extracts 
evidence of those interests and claims from the records of cases in 
which those interests and claims are not expressly made manifest.   
I find this approach bold but convincing, at least in this case. 
If I were to fault Professor Richardson’s approach to narrative, 
it would only be for being a tad more prickly than I think is 
warranted with respect to the methods necessary to give voice to 
the historically marginalized.  Such historical narratives are of 
necessity more speculative than are similar narratives that can be 
based on more traditional historical sources, such as first-hand, 
eye-witness accounts, such as journals, autobiographies and the 
like – or even contemporaneous secondary sources such as 
journalistic accounts written from a perspective relatively 
sympathetic to that of the historical subjects.  Still, the difference is 
really one of degree.  I am fully convinced that Thucydides was the 
author of Pericles’ Funeral Oration, but the fact that Thucydides 
presented his own words as though they were uttered by the 
Athenian leader does nothing to diminish my estimation of him as 
a historian.  Historical recreation is always an imaginative act.   
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In any case, nowadays even biographers of the Founding 
Fathers engage in novelistic recreations of 18th-century dialogue, 
and Stephen Greenblatt and his fellow New Historicists pile 
speculation upon speculation in order to develop theories of the 
early modern imagination.   In the light of such methodological 
heterodoxy, it is hardly suspect if a historian of the African-
American experience engages in reasonable speculations regarding 
the frames of mind of 17th and 18th century African-American 
slaves.  It may be that what I have called Professor Richardson’s 
prickliness derives from the methodological conservatism of legal 
historians, who inhabit a notorious backwater of the historical 
profession, and from the gulf separating what passes for innovative 
scholarship in that field and the tradition of creative historical 
reconstruction pioneered by Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado and 
others.   
While I would not fault Professor Richardson’s historical 
methodology, his invocation of international law can be a bit 
confusing, if not misleading.  The way Professor Richardson 
speaks of international law in the 16th through the early 19th 
century is in tension with the international lawyer’s comfortable 
assumptions regarding that body of law primitive state in the early 
modern era, but it is not Professor Richardson’s intention to call 
those assumptions into question.  Rather, what he means by an 
“interest” in international law is something like an ideal-typical 
reconstruction of what protections international law might offer – 
or what rights it might convey – upon enslaved Africans. 
But because it is so easy to confuse invocations of this interest 
in international law both with the real international law (which was 
not helpful to African-Americans) and with other, more robust 
forms of what Professor Richardson calls “outside law,” I am left 
wondering about the usefulness of Professor Richardson’s 
terminology.  What does it mean to say that people enslaved in the 
Americas appealed to international law? 
It clearly does not mean that they appealed to Grotius, 
Pufendorf or Vattel or to other early formulations of international 
law and pointed out to their captors that enslavement was 
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inconsistent with principles recognized in treatises on international 
law.  They could not do so for two reasons.  First, Professor 
Richardson concedes that, for the most part, African slaves had no 
familiarity with such texts.  He also concedes that, with the 
exception of the few occasions on which enslaved Africans made 
their reliance on notions of international law explicit, the extent to 
which African-Americans were even aware of the existence of a 
sub-species of outside law called international law is a matter of 
speculation.  In any case, during the period covered by the book, 
international law did not proscribe slavery and did not recognize 
the various rights claimed by enslaved Africans.  There were 
always currents within international legal theory that recognized a 
certain tension between principles of international law and the fact 
of slavery, but those tensions persisted nonetheless. 
There was no right to be free from capture, and there was a 
very limited body of what we now call international human rights 
and humanitarian law that constrained warring parties in their 
treatment of captured persons.  Nor were there international rules 
or customs regulating the treatment of slaves, indentured servants 
or employees for hire.  As Professor Richardson’s work illustrates, 
the status of Africans was very different under Dutch, English, 
Spanish and Portuguese colonialism, but these differing practices 
were a product of the laws of the differing empires and were not 
subject to international regulation.  Professor Richardson cannot 
recount any case in which of any of those governments raised 
objections to the treatment of slaves under the laws of one of the 
others.  They did not do so because they believed they had no right 
or interest to do so under international law. 
Which brings me to the more troublesome problem – and this 
continues to be a problem for international law today – the subjects 
of international law were states.  Only states had rights and 
obligations under international law that they could seek to enforce 
through adjudicatory bodies, through diplomatic means, or through 
resort to force.  So, even if international law recognized the sorts of 
legal claims identified by Professor Richardson, individual slaves, 
even groups of slaves, had no standing to raise such claims.  Early 
modern international law recognized no right of self-determination 
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and no right of rebellion.  There simply was no legal person who 
could press the claims of enslaved Africans or represent their 
interests as a matter of international law.  While Professor 
Richardson contends that some independent African communities 
in the Caribbean and South America achieved a status akin to 
international personhood, he does not claim that such independent 
communities arose in North America. 
Things might be different if we lived in a monist world in 
which all international legal norms are automatically incorporated 
as domestic law as well.  In the period covered by Professor 
Richardson’s book, however, England was expressly dualist.  As 
Professor Richardson acknowledges, only Parliament had the 
power to make domestic law, and international rules were binding 
only to the extent they were enacted through parliamentary 
legislation.   The Supremacy Clause gives the United States 
Constitution’s more of a monist cast, but U.S. constitutional 
history tilts more in the dualist direction, as Professor Richardson 
also acknowledges.  As a result, even if international law created 
certain rights, it would not automatically provide a cause of action 
or a remedy to African-Americans. 
Things also might be different if international law were a sub-
species of natural law, although even Grotian natural law permitted 
slavery and refused to recognize a right of rebellion or escape.  But 
in the period covered in Professor Richardson’s book, international 
law evolved from Grotius’s natural law foundations to Vattel’s 
legal positivism, and there it has remained, for the most part, ever 
since.  Even in Grotius’s era, the natural law foundations of 
international law were largely theoretical in nature.  Law derived 
from custom, and early modern practices provide a weak basis for 
a claimed equivalence of international law and moral law.  Both 
the Roman and the Christian traditions managed to reconcile 
notions of human dignity and higher law with the permissibility of 
enslavement and the impermissibility of rebellion.  So, while 
Professor Richardson is able to provide ample evidence of appeals 
to natural law, to the laws of other nations (including African 
custom) and to the laws of England and its colonies, he has great 
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difficulty identifying appeals to international law that are not better 
understood as really falling into one of the other categories. 
More generally, there is a tendency in the book to assume that 
the natural law approach to international law holds out more 
promise for African-Americans than does the positivist approach.  
I have my doubts about that, although I could not dispute the 
extensive evidence marshaled by Professor Richardson in support 
of the view that the African-American interest in outside law often 
appeals to some form of natural law.  Still, natural law has rarely 
been a progressive force.  Natural law arguments helped to justify 
white domination, male domination and heterosexism.  And they 
continue to do so.  On the other hand, much that has been 
accomplished through the international human rights movement in 
the post-war era has been accomplished through a very simple 
arrangement.  Different cultures might not be able to agree on 
ultimate truth, but if they can just agree that certain practices are 
unlawful, then we can probably make some pretty good progress 
towards international regulation of at least the most extreme forms 
of inhumanity.   
One’s enjoyment of the book does not turn, however, on a 
satisfying rejoinder to these criticisms.  I learned a great deal 
reading it.  Its general discussion of a Black tradition of appeal to 
outside law is informative, convincing and above all helpful in 
providing a conceptual matrix that aids in the understanding of 
Black political practices.  Professor Richardson states several times 
in the book that the task will have to fall to some other scholar to 
continue the narrative he has begun into the present.   That is a 
shame, as a second volume would be of extraordinary use.  In his 
introduction, Professor Richardson situates famous speeches of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and W.E.B. Dubois in the context of the 
Black international tradition in a compelling way.  This reader 
would be very interested to read the narrative that connects 
Professor Richardson’s account of that tradition up to 1812 with 
these very important 20th-century African American perspectives 
on international law and U.S. foreign relations. 
